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Abstract 
 
Recently the English NHS has introduced an activity-based payment scheme for secondary 
care - the Payment by Results (PbR) policy.  In this paper we discuss, from an economic 
perspective, the main intended and unintended incentives created by this policy.  We also 
outline the role of different NHS institutions in monitoring and analysing the impact of PbR 
and consider the information and data requirements for such tasks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The NHS has been the subject of constant reform since 1948.  A major change affecting financial 
flows was the introduction of the internal market almost 15 years ago.  The separation of the 
purchasing and providing functions and the introduction of contractual relationships marked a 
fundamental shift from the previous system whereby providers were allocated resources directly and 
made decisions about health care provision largely based on historical patterns.  In contrast, the 
internal market introduced the purchasing function and the aim was to encourage provider 
competition for contracts which was seen as the key to improving quality and efficiency and to 
widening patients' choice.  Money was meant to “follow patients” and providers that were successful 
would attract patients and therefore income.   
 
In 1997, the Labour government chose not to dismantle the internal market wholesale but to retain 
some features, including the separation of the purchasing and providing function.  The political 
rhetoric stressed cooperation rather than competition with a strong emphasis on planning and 
partnership and changes were made to commissioning roles, in particular the creation of Primary 
Care Organisations (now Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)).  However, more recently, the emphasis has 
shifted back towards encouraging providers to compete (albeit on quality), facilitating the development 
of a mixed economy of care including the private sector, and enhancing choice for patients.
1
 
 
The introduction of payment by results (PbR) is a key element in the general strategy outlined above.  
It represents another significant change in the nature of financial mechanisms in the NHS and is 
designed to support related policies of patient choice and practice based commissioning.  The PbR 
policy shares some of the basic characteristics of the prospective payment policy initiated in the USA 
in 1984, and subsequently adopted in many countries worldwide.   However, the PbR framework has 
been designed in order to address, at least in part, the lessons learnt over the past twenty years by 
other countries which have experienced drawbacks of a prospective payment system. In principle, the 
NHS therefore starts one step ahead of many other countries. However, as we outline later some 
fundamental issues still exist, related to the incentives created by the policy.  
 
Providers are reimbursed on a case mix adjusted tariff determined centrally and based on the 
average of all hospital costs for that procedure.  The tariff is built upon average reference costs for 
each Health Resource Group (HRG), with separate tariffs for elective and non elective care. Providers 
are reimbursed on this prospective tariff according to their activity, regardless of their actual cost 
levels.  Adjustments are made in order to account for unavoidable regional differences, cost 
pressures, technological change, outliers (both positive and negative), critical care work and specialist 
work.   
 
Implementation of PbR is to be phased in from 2003/04 to 2008/09.  Initially the focus is on elective 
care only. The first stage occurred in 2003/04 with PCTs commissioning a limited number of HRG 
procedures.  From 2004/05 PCTs were asked to use the new arrangements to commission most of 
the services provided by Foundation Trusts. In the current year, 2005/06, all acute specialist Trusts 
are participating in the new system. The inclusion of non-elective care and outpatient care services for 
all non-Foundation Trusts will begin in 2006/07, and by 2008/09 the implementation will be completed 
with the inclusion of mental health and ambulance Trusts.
2
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2. General aims of the policy 
 
The Department of Health and other commentators have indicated a number of different aims of the 
PbR policy.
3
  These are summarised below. 
 
Box 1:  Stated aims and benefits of PbR  
 
 Increase efficiency in the provision of existing levels of activity 
 Where needed, encourage expansion of activity  
 Enhance patient choice  
 Increase patient satisfaction 
 Encourage providers to be responsive to patient and commissioner preferences  
 Keep costs under control  
 Channel funding where it is most needed 
 Introduce fairness and transparency in funding providers  
 Encourage the development of new, cost-effective treatment pathways  
 Shift patterns of service provision away from historical patterns 
 Improve quality 
 
 
This broad range of objectives is extremely ambitious and if they were all to be achieved, this would 
translate into substantial improvements in terms of efficiency, responsiveness and patient outcomes.  
However, some aims are more difficult to achieve than others, some are long-term rather than short-
term, and others may conflict to a certain degree.   We discuss in greater detail below, some of the 
economic issues that arise when considering how the key aims and benefits of PbR may be achieved. 
 
Firstly, there is an expectation that providers will increase activity and this has indeed been the 
experience in many countries where prospective payment has been introduced.  The intention is to 
tackle waiting lists for elective and out-patient care and to encourage providers to be responsive to 
patient demand.  However, conversely, commissioners will need to guard against increased activity 
by acute trusts in areas where this is unwarranted (eg where they wish to develop alternative services 
in the community or outside the acute hospital sector).  Providers will have an incentive to increase 
activity in any area where the tariff is greater than their marginal costs and this may affect the mix of 
activity unless monitored carefully.  From a global perspective, the impact on overall expenditure will 
need to be scrutinised as the growth in total activity, even at tariff prices, cannot be allowed to 
develop unchecked without jeopardising fixed budgets. Commissioners will need methods of 
controlling the pace and pattern of increased activity.    
 
Secondly, the Department of Health expects that PbR will give providers an incentive to find ways of 
providing services more efficiently.
4
  By reducing their costs below tariff levels, providers will have the 
opportunity to gain extra income. For commissioners, the key issue will be the means by which 
providers reduce costs – they will need to be assured that savings are not made by reducing quality.  
Indeed, one of the stated aims of the PbR policy is to focus commisioner-provider discussions on 
matters of quality rather than price.   
 
Thirdly, various subsidiary aims are also attributed to PbR policy by the Department of Health 
although many are to be achieved in tandem with related policies such as the extension of patient 
choice and the move to practice based commissioning. In particular, there is an expectation that PbR 
will facilitate choice by encouraging new providers into the market, creating a mixed economy of care 
and allowing potential competition between providers from both the public and private sector. 
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The focus of this report is to consider the incentive effects created by the PbR policy in light of the 
policy aims described above, and to outline the nature of the information required to monitor such 
effects.  In section 3 we describe the expected impact on behaviour in the following key areas:  
appropriate and inappropriate changes in activity; cost reducing behaviour and the potential impact on 
quality; specialisation of services and related access issues, and manipulation and gaming 
behaviours.    Section 4 refers briefly to the implications for financial risk in the system.  Section 5 
outlines the information requirements for monitoring the behaviours identified in section 3, covering 
data on: activity, cost, quality, access and general performance.  The design of particular features of 
PbR and the degree to which they may help to forestall some of the potentially negative impacts is 
discussed in Section 6.  Section 7 discusses the roles that might be played by organisations at 
different levels such as PCTs, Strategic Health Authorities (StHAs), the Department of Health or other 
central agencies.  Section 8 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
3. Incentive effects of PbR 
 
Incentives can be deliberately designed or can arise as an unintended consequence of a policy.  In 
the following section we base our discussion around the intended and unintended incentive effects of 
prospective payment systems, with particular attention paid to the specific design features of the PbR 
policy.  We outline the insights that can be gained from the application of economic theory. The key 
issues we have therefore selected for discussion are ones highlighted as potential “danger areas” by 
the literature relating to the incentive effects of prospective payment systems.  We do not focus a 
great deal on the empirical evidence, most of which is from overseas and has been outlined in detail 
elsewhere,
5
 though we refer to recent English evidence where appropriate.  
 
It is important to remember that the way in which providers and commissioners respond to the 
incentives produced by PbR will also depend on the impact of other related policies that are being 
implemented at the same time – such as patient choice and practice based commissioning.  It is often 
difficult to disentangle the impact of a single policy. 
 
3.1 Appropriate and inappropriate changes in activity 
 
PbR is intended to reward providers who respond to demand by increasing activity or by changing the 
mix of their activity.  It also offers a degree of security of income to new providers who enter the 
market in order to meet demand.  The expectation is that outpatient and in-patient waiting lists will be 
reduced through the operation of PbR.  If it is the case that patients (or their agents) have faced an 
under-supply of a particular service in an area, then providers that increase their activity levels in 
order to meet demand, are also responding appropriately to incentives.   
 
In some instances there may be changes in the distribution of activity without any overall increase.  
So for example, if the quality offered by a specific provider is sufficiently high to attract demand away 
from other providers, it is appropriate that their treatment volume increases at the expense of the 
lower quality provider. 
 
Issues for providers and PCTs:  From the perspective of the Acute Trusts, there are strong 
incentives to increase activity in areas where their marginal costs are less than the tariff.  However, 
unless there are obvious ways of reducing costs (see section 3.2), the incentive to expand in all other 
areas is rather limited and there is no guarantee that this will coincide with the pattern of demand 
expressed by commissioners.    
 
Providers currently have an incentive to stimulate demand “artificially” above the levels that may be 
clinically necessary and above the level that can be afforded by PCTs operating within a fixed budget 
constraint.  For example, providers may take action to encourage unnecessary referrals or follow-up 
procedures or may expand medical staffing into sub-speciality areas to generate new demand. It is 
likely that the incentives for acute providers to expand activity or to develop into new acute areas will 
mitigate against other policy priorities. The latter includes the growth of community services and 
primary care as an alternative to hospital care, and the development of integrated care.  More 
services are expected to be provided outside hospitals (for example the forthcoming White Paper is 
                                                 
5
 Street and Hussain (2004) 
4     CHE Research Paper 19 
expected to outline further plans for shifting more services into primary care) and the overall goal of 
much of government policy is to keep people out of hospital.  The PbR policy as it stands at present 
may make it difficult to achieve this and to attain major shifts in provision from the acute to community 
sector.  Hospital activity will therefore need to be monitored carefully in order to assess both 
affordability and the appropriateness of patterns of services.   
 
If PbR produces a shift in activity between providers, there is a risk to the viability of providers who 
lose substantial amounts of income over a relatively short period of time.  Whilst this might be justified 
on the grounds of efficiency or quality gains, it may also lead to large deficits and even wholesale 
withdrawal of a provider if they are unable to reduce their fixed costs in line with reduced income.  As 
many hospital costs are joint costs or are fixed in the medium to long term (eg tenured medical staff), 
it is clear that this will present a challenge that may only be met over a long period of time with careful 
disinvestment plans.  Providers that are unable to make these changes in the short-term may become 
unviable and a local population may find itself without core services if a provider exits the market 
altogether.  We consider further the issues of financial risk in section 4.   
 
The issue for PCTs and StHAs is therefore to ensure that PbR is used imaginatively to enhance the 
supply and mix of services (otherwise the opportunity to change historical patterns of service 
provision will be lost), but with an eye on maintaining the viability of key services locally and managing 
change over an appropriate period of time.  The Audit Commission’s report on the early experience of 
PbR suggests that, in practice, providers and PCTs have had to enter into various agreements such 
as caps and floors on activity in order to ensure the delivery of key services and avoid the 
destabilisation of finances locally.
6
  Whilst this may be seen as a necessary interim measure, the 
effect is to dilute the power of the incentives for facilitating major changes in delivery patterns offered 
by the PbR policy.  
 
An important monitoring issue for commissioners will therefore be to ensure that providers are not 
manipulating demand above the levels warranted by clinical need.  Manipulating demand might take 
the form of encouraging patients as inpatients when they could be treated in ambulatory care, 
admitting patients from A&E unnecessarily, disaggregating hospital stays into multiple admissions, or 
attempting to attract relatively healthy patients within a given HRG.  PCTs will need to monitor activity 
appropriately as there is already some evidence emerging to suggest that Foundation Trusts have 
experienced a greater increase in short stay in-patient admissions from A&E than non-Foundation 
Trusts.
7
  However, other analyses have suggested that there is little evidence of increased 
admissions amongst hospitals in selected PCT areas.
8
 
 
3.2 Cost reduction and impact on quality 
 
Prospective payment systems have traditionally been implemented in order to control global 
expenditure and evidence suggests that this aim has generally been achieved.  Purely prospective 
systems based on an average cost across the whole of the patient population create high-powered 
incentives for providers to undertake cost containment efforts in order to appropriate the difference 
between average costs and actual costs.  However, it would be misleading to restrict evaluation of 
PbR to success in containing overall costs as the method by which costs are contained is also of vital 
importance.  Perverse incentives also exist for “inefficient” cost reduction which have adverse effects 
on quality.
9
 
 
Issues for providers and PCTs:  A reduction in unit costs can be achieved in a variety of ways.  
There may be a general tightening up of management and organisational processes in the hospital 
and a reduction in slack: for example, better scheduling of appointments and operations, more 
efficient discharge arrangements, more efficient procurement of supplies and changes to working 
hours.  Alternatively, the mix of inputs may be reconsidered and altered: for example, better use of 
ancillary staff, reductions in use of agency staff, use of specialised staff from overseas or investment 
in new technology.  Other possibilities include changes to the actual process of care: for example, 
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reduction in length of stay
10
 and switching to day case procedures.  Changes may also be made to 
the range of activities and outputs provided: for example, the “unbundling” of services so as to 
specialise in a particular procedure (eg cataract removal) which can be organised more efficiently. Or 
decisions may be made to disinvest in certain discretionary activities such as continuing education or 
research activities.    
These actions can be labelled as desirable to the extent that they may reduce inefficiencies and in 
some cases avoid the over-supply of treatment.  However, in almost every example outlined above, 
there is the potential for unintended and negative impacts to arise as well as positive effects.  So, for 
example, attempts to reduce length of stay may lead to premature discharge (and subsequent 
readmission); unbundling of services may have detrimental effects on outcome when different 
services are linked and complement each other; even relatively straightforward actions such as the 
search for more cost-effective supplies can potentially have a down-side if quality of the product is 
sacrificed.  In addition, although many of the actions will reduce costs in the short-run (eg reducing 
investment in training), they may not necessarily work towards long-run cost-effectiveness.   Evidence 
from the USA suggests that financial pressures arising from cost sharing rules can negatively affect 
hospital quality levels in terms of mortality.
11
  This is similar in the UK, where Trusts are under 
pressure to compete.
12
 
 
After examining the difference in the number of Trusts with reference costs above and below tariff in 
2004 and 2005, the Audit Commission reported that although the gap between high and low cost 
Trusts had narrowed, there was still a “substantial agenda” of cost improvement for the NHS and a 
large scale transfer of resources required.
13
  This suggests that it will be important to keep track of the 
means by which cost reductions are achieved and to ensure that quality does not deteriorate as a 
result.  
 
3.3 Specialisation and access issues 
  
As outlined in section 3.1, if providers are genuinely unable to reduce unit costs for whatever reason 
then they may be tempted to withdraw from the service altogether.   Indeed, if there are economies of 
scale in provision, it may be the case that providers will begin to specialise where they can most 
efficiently provide a service.   Alternatively, specialisation may take the form of focusing on the 
provision of HRGs where the average severity of illness (and therefore cost) is lower. 
 
Issues for providers and PCTs:  Although efficiency gains may be made overall through efficient 
specialisation and exploitation of economies of scale, “localness” may be a desirable feature of some 
elements of health care provision.  PCTs may not gain overall from re-organisation of services along 
these lines because although the cost of services may be reduced and possibly quality improved, 
serious geographical access issues may arise for some of their population.
14
 
 
If care becomes very compartmentalised, problems may also arise in relation to the intention to 
provide “seamless” care for patients. Specialists might have the incentive to provide more intensive 
treatments to less severe patients in order to increase the surpluses or maintain demand for their 
services.
15
 
 
One of the challenges for PCTs will be to balance the need to ensure access for key services to all 
their local population whilst at the same time encouraging providers to supply services in an efficient 
way whereby the latter might involve a greater degree of specialisation than the current pattern of 
services demonstrates. Indeed, if specialisation also improves quality of care (eg the debate about 
whether greater volume produces better outcomes), PCTs may find that patient choice drives them 
further down this route.   
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3.4 Manipulation and gaming 
 
Prospective payment systems are associated with the potential for manipulation and gaming by 
providers and PbR is no exception.  From an economic perspective the potential for manipulation is 
related to the characteristics of the environment in which PbR is implemented and in particular the 
existence of asymmetry of information, the multi-task nature of health care treatment and the structure 
of the coding system.
16
 
 
The existence of asymmetry of information implies that providers will always have more information 
than the PCTs about the nature of some of the tasks they are meant to undertake.  However, if 
incentives are attached to those areas in which observation and measurement are easier, then effort 
may well be driven towards these tasks at the expense of others.
17
  McClellan (1997) points out that 
the HRG system (and the PbR system is similar) is not actually fully prospective. A fully prospective 
payment would imply that once the patient is admitted in the hospital, the tariff received by the 
provider cannot be influenced by the decisions and behaviour of the provider.  However, providers 
can indeed influence the tariff received through the process of “up-coding”, that is, reporting of the 
more intensive and expensive treatments,
18
 causing “HRG drift”.   Providers can select an 
unnecessary diagnosis or the most expensive diagnosis for a patient.  Most of the expenditure growth 
in the Medicare Program seems to be attributable to the increase in the use of more intensive 
treatments during hospitals admissions.
19
  Providers may also misclassify patients into specialist 
HRGs which are funded through other arrangements: discharge them early in order to attract another 
payment when they are readmitted later, or manipulate length of stay in order to push the patient into 
a higher paying category.
20
  
 
A recent study by Becker et al (2005) based on data from the Medicare Program, 1994 to 1998, looks 
at the impact of enforcement laws on the abusive behaviour by providers (abusive behaviour defined 
as the supply of treatment without a counterpart health benefit). The authors find evidence of the 
existence of such behaviour and conclude that stricter enforcement laws are necessary in order to 
control them.  In England, there is no firm evidence at present that “HRG drift” is a serious concern
21
 
but it will be necessary to keep reviewing trends in HRG recording. A recent analysis of trends in 
casemix for the top 20 HRGs (by volume) in a sample of hospitals did not find systematic evidence of 
upcoding attributable to PbR, but did find trends that suggested further investigation may be 
warranted.
22
  For example, in one hospital, the proportion of procedures coded as “with complications” 
increased by almost 300% over a five year period.   Some issues may be best dealt with at a central 
level when assessing changes to the design of the tariff.  For example, one potential way to tackle the 
up-coding problem is to develop a larger number of HRGs to account for the large cost variations 
found within some HRG groups. This amounts to a second generation of HRGs or constant HRG 
refinement. However, in order to address the problem completely, one would eventually need as 
many HRGs as individual cases which would clearly not be feasible.   Such a process would also 
eventually dilute the incentives for cost reduction as it gets closer to pure cost reimbursement. 
 
Other problems deriving from information asymmetry, relate to the selection of patients, rather than to 
what happens to them once they are admitted to hospital.  Dumping (explicit avoidance of high 
severity patients) and deliberate attempts to attract relatively low severity patients has been noted in 
the literature although it is not easy to see how providers in the NHS could do this on a widespread 
basis, at least for most types of care.
23
  However, for some conditions where it may be possible to 
manipulate treatment thresholds or where a good deal of clinical discretion exists about decisions to 
admit, this may be a serious issue.  For example, there may be an incentive to treat low cost patients 
earlier where there is a waiting list and where patients can be selected on the basis of likely severity; 
or to reduce thresholds so that low severity patients receive treatment that they would not previously 
have received.  Conversely, for conditions such as mental illness, there may be opportunities to avoid 
costly in-patient admissions by re-interpreting the thresholds for admission at a higher level than is 
                                                 
16
 Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
17
 Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
18
 Carter, Newhouse and Relles (1990), McClellan (1997) 
19
 McClellan (1997), Becker et al (2005) 
20
 Frank and Lave (1989), Carroll and Erwin (1987), Fitzgerald et al. (1988) 
21
 Rogers et al (2005) 
22
 YHEC (2005) 
23
 Ellis (1998), Newhouse (1996) 
The Incentive Effects of Payment by Results     7 
 
 
warranted clinically.  Such decisions are often matters of judgement and are therefore difficult to 
challenge.  
  
Theory suggests that perverse outcomes and poor quality care arising from dumping activities may be 
avoided by making payments depend on the number of patients wanting treatment and the number 
who actually receive it.
24
  Thus it might be possible to withhold payments from providers if it can be 
demonstrated that there are patients who should have been treated but instead were excluded.  
However, this does not work very well if there are dimensions of “quality” other than just whether 
treatment was delivered or not.  Where other aspects of quality are also relevant, monitoring is the 
only way of avoiding perverse outcomes.   The implication is that population admission rates should 
be monitored for relevant key conditions in order to detect changes over time or between providers.  If 
such changes appear to be significant and have no alternative explanation (eg reductions in 
admission rates for mental illness could be the result of improved substitute services in the community) 
they may be indicative of inappropriate provider behaviours and more detailed investigation would be 
warranted. 
 
 
4. Financial risk 
 
The collective impact of many of the potential actions and behaviours induced by PbR that we have 
outlined above will increase radically the degree of financial risk and potential instability in the health 
care system, for both providers and PCTs. This is to be expected as the impact of the policy on 
services would be very limited if there were no significant changes in financial flows through the 
system. Forcing organisations to bear a greater degree of risk may also induce better financial 
discipline and accountability.    
 
One key to balancing these costs and benefits will be for providers and PCTs to work together to plan 
and monitor activity, ensure affordability and develop contingency plans for unforeseen circumstances.   
However, early experience suggests that perhaps the rapid pace of change may not be conducive to 
such collaborative working, and where local health economies are struggling financially, PbR appears 
to polarise interests and force institutions into a narrow focus on their own interests.
25
  Other solutions 
may be found centrally through changes in the design of the tariff or the pace of the roll-out of the 
policy.  The challenge here will be to ensure that the power of the incentives introduced by PbR is not 
completely diminished through constantly tweaking the system in order to avoid major upheaval and 
change.  
 
 
5. Information requirements 
 
In the sections below we consider the information requirements - mainly from the PCT perspective (as 
requested in the brief) – in order to monitor the various potential positive and negative impacts of PbR 
as outlined in section 3.  It is beyond the scope of this exercise to determine the details of information 
systems and variation in information available nationally at PCT level as this would require a separate 
exercise. 
 
Gathering information is not an end in itself and its value is not confined to the monitoring function 
alone.  The information collected at each stage of the commissioning activity feeds into the next.  So 
information collected for planning will be crucial for efficient contracting. After delivery, the information 
collected will be essential for monitoring and, then again for planning, and so on. 
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Before outlining the information requirements for monitoring the impact of PbR, we first consider two 
general issues – (i) data quality and (ii) nature of comparative data.   
 
5.1 Data quality 
 
An underlying theme of the following discussion on information requirements is the importance of 
having high quality data that is timely and accurate and in which providers and commissioners (and 
the Department of Health) can be confident.  It is beyond the scope of this report to outline all the 
relevant data quality issues but it is sufficient here to note the Audit Commission’s early findings from 
PbR which concluded that the introduction of the policy highlighted the inadequacy of much of the 
existing data on which decisions are based.
26
  In itself, the introduction of PbR will drive up data 
quality but as the Audit Commission noted, experience elsewhere suggest this has taken “time, effort 
and investment in information systems and people to achieve this …” (p23).  The poor quality of 
coding in Trusts has been noted recently.
27
  At the Department of Health, attention will need to be 
given to how organisations are to be incentivised to improve quality, and this may involve some 
degree of central oversight and monitoring for quality assurance, local  implementation policies and 
penalties for poor performance in this area.  It will also entail investment in appropriate infrastructure, 
including a commitment to fund high calibre coders.  We return to this issue in section 7. 
 
5.2 Comparative data 
  
Trusts, PCTs, Strategic Health Authorities and central organisations will require comparative data in 
order to monitor the impact of PbR.  The relevant comparators will vary depending on the type of data 
examined and the context.  In some cases it will be appropriate to study trends over time by single 
provider or groups of providers, looking for consistency or for shifts in behaviour and activities.  
Similarly, trends over time in population data may be relevant in some instances (eg mortality rates, 
admission rates).   In other circumstances, comparisons between providers or between PCTs may be 
more appropriate, either between organisations within a geographical area or nationally between 
organisations with similar characteristics.  Benchmarking against other organisations could therefore 
be a useful activity undertaken by StHAs, the Department of Health or by other organisations. Local, 
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regional or national comparisons will be appropriate in different circumstances.   Analysis can be 
undertaken at aggregate level or at specialty or HRG level. 
 
5.3 Basic activity data 
 
In order to track trends in the level and type of activity undertaken by Acute Trusts it is necessary to 
consider data in the following areas, ensuring that a picture of trends over time and between providers 
can be built up: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using this data, it is possible to identify growth areas, areas where reductions are occurring, in-
patient/day case ratios, admission rates by specialty etc.  Changes can be detected in admission 
rates from out-patients and A&E departments and changes in case-mix and case-mix complexity 
which may indicate up-coding behaviour.  As well as examining trends over time, such data will also 
allow effective benchmarking at the trust or PCT level. 
 
5.4 Basic cost data 
 
The aim is to assess whether and how cost reductions are being made by providers.  Ideally the data 
would also shed light on whether cost shifting is occurring, but some of this data is harder to collect.  It 
might include: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst it would be useful to explore trends in marginal versus average costs, especially for HRGs 
where significant activity changes are expected, it is unlikely that these can be monitored effectively 
and accurately by PCTs or other organisations on a routine basis.  Such data will be very vulnerable 
to variation in accounting practices and are more likely to make sense within the context of a detailed 
examination of a specific clinical area at a local level.   
 Elective and non-elective in-patient spells and days 
 A&E and out-patient and day patient contacts – first attendance plus follow up 
 In total, plus disaggregated by speciality and HRG 
 Number of HRGs coded as with and without complications in each area of 
activity (IP, OP etc) 
 Number and nature of outliers eg patients with very long stays 
 Day case rates 
 Admission volumes and thresholds for all types of care 
 Admissions from outpatients 
 Admissions via A&E  
 Total A&E admissions 
 Referrals between Trusts and nursing homes
1
  
 Referral patterns from PCTs   
 Average cost per spell across elective and non-elective inpatient, A&E, day case and 
outpatients.  This is tariff cost (national) and reference cost (local) data.  Changes in costs 
compared over time and across providers. 
 Other useful pieces of information would include changes in the costs of services that 
might be considered substitutes for or complements to, in-patient care.   
 Trends in costs for activities covered by PbR compared with trends in costs of  excluded 
services, in order to flag up potential cost-shifting behaviour 
 Comparative data on total volume and cost by HRG by provider size, location, type of 
hospital, teaching status and region 
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5.5 Data on quality 
  
The identification of trends in certain activities may flag up potential quality issues although in almost 
all cases further in-depth investigation would be required to determine if the trends were a cause for 
concern: 
 
 
 
Some of the above would need to go beyond the bare minimum for example, on length of stay (LOS), 
it would be necessary not only to look at average LOS but to check distributions and to examine 
whether hospitals are keeping patients until they reach standard thresholds beyond which the tariff 
changes. 
 
5.6 Data on access 
 
Potential access problems might be suggested by examination of the following data: 
 
 
 
Particular attention should be paid to services where a local element is important, either because of 
the nature of the service or because of the socio-economic characteristics of the local population 
served. 
 Trends in the number and geographical distribution of hospital beds 
 Changes in geographic distribution of beds by specialty 
 Size distribution of hospitals 
 Distribution of consultants   
 Transfer of patients between providers and between providers of different types (eg to 
nursing homes) 
 
 Availability of follow-up services 
 Specific data on high risk patients who may be selected out by providers  
 Changes in the patterns of care available at local level (eg loss of a service) 
 Access to ambulatory care (given that it is one of the major modes of entry the health 
delivery system) 
 
 Waiting times 
 Distance travelled to key services 
 
 Length of stay 
 Discharge patterns and readmission rates  
 Data relating to clinical thresholds
1
 
 Data on “frequent flyer” patients (including demographic indicators, specialities, type of 
care, etc.) 
 
 Staffing levels and staff/patient ratios per speciality and by HRG 
 Mortality rates – in-patient and post-discharge, risk adjusted where possible
1
  
 Health status data if available 
 Waiting times
1
 
 Changes made to physical facilities and technologies used and changes in the type, 
number and qualification of health professionals employed (eg number of doctors per bed; 
proportion of bank nurses)    
 
 Results of patient satisfaction surveys  
 Data on effectiveness and safety of new technologies after a period of use 
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5.7 Performance 
 
Performance data will be crucial not only to check the impact of PbR but also to allow PCTs to 
effectively manage local demand, allow providers to focus on efficiency improvement and provide 
patients with the necessary tools to make informed choices. 
 
Many of the measures mentioned already can be used to indicate performance of providers (or 
performance within a specific HRG or speciality) either over time or relative to other providers locally 
or nationally. So for example, readmission rates, risk adjusted mortality rates and waiting times are 
relevant as are any data arising from patient surveys of satisfaction or health outcome surveys.  
Providers and commissioners can use such information to target areas for improvement or to identify 
areas where PbR appears to positively or negatively affect performance. 
 
5.8 Other data 
 
PCTs and StHAs will want to combine data from some of the above sources with information from 
other sources such as evidence on patient choice, “marketing” activities of providers, changes in care 
pathways, trends in activities covered under payment by results and excluded services that are 
funded at cost.  Effective local management will involve combining the above data with socio-
demographic data at neighbourhood level. All data will need to be considered in the local context with 
full information about the links within and between local health economies. 
 
 
6. Avoiding negative impacts 
 
We outlined in section 3 some of the strategies that may be taken in order to offset, or at least to 
monitor, some of the potential negative impacts of PbR.  However, PbR has been designed in such a 
way to avoid some of the known weaknesses of other prospective payment systems that might 
otherwise jeopardise achievement of the benefits outlined in section 2.   We consider these briefly in 
turn. 
 
On the supply side, PbR has been formulated to allow for local realities such as the existence of local 
specific costs and high cost outlier cases.  Prospective payment policies that pay providers according 
to a centrally determined fixed tariff ignore  “localness” and unavoidable differences in costs and may 
therefore discriminate against providers (and ultimately patients) in affected areas.  In these 
circumstances, providers may reduce quality or skimp on provision if they are unable to cover the 
higher costs they incur simply because of their location.  PbR as implemented in England adjusts the 
tariff through the use of a Market Forces Factor and by adjusting for the number and nature of outliers. 
However, in the longer-term it will be necessary to revisit such adjustments in order to ensure they 
relate only to unavoidable cost variations.   Otherwise there is a danger that inefficient providers will 
be subsidised at the expense of those who manage to adjust their costs over the longer-term. 
 
Another potential weakness of prospective payment systems is the perverse effect they may have on 
the capacity of providers to take up new cost-effective technologies. If the fixed tariffs do not account 
for the initial large investment costs required for the adoption of a new equipment or technology, 
providers might refrain from adopting them in order to avoid (short run) financial losses. In order to 
address the issue of the adoption and diffusion of cost effective technology the Department of Health 
is considering alternative mechanisms of adjusting the cost weight for specific technologies in order to 
ensure that tariffs reflect the higher initial costs. 
 
On the demand side, the potential for quality to be reduced in order to contain costs, may in part be 
tackled through the mechanism of patient choice.  By facilitating choice for patients as well as 
encouraging entry of new providers and enhanced competition, providers may be incentivised to 
improve quality in order to attract a higher share of patient demand.   The extent to which this proves 
to be an effective mechanism depends on the degree to which choice is exercised effectively, by or 
on behalf of patients.  This is linked directly to the nature of the commissioning role. PCTs need to 
develop appropriate commissioning techniques that effectively coordinate planning, purchasing and 
monitoring activities in order to ensure the local provision of (efficient) care whilst meeting national 
targets and staying within allocated budgets.  PCTs will decide on the patterns of service provision 
required to meet local demand, including care that will be supplied by the PCTs themselves. They will 
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need to be aware of the capacity of each provider and the quality of the service they provide.  
Negotiation and contracting will need to be designed to reflect incentives for quality and efficiency and 
risk pooling arrangements.  They will also need to develop methods of monitoring activities in order to 
ensure that services are actually being delivered and that outcomes and patient satisfaction are 
satisfactory.  We return to the key role of commissioners in section 7 below. 
 
 
7. The role of organisations at different levels 
 
In this report we have focused, as requested in the brief, mainly on the role and information 
requirements of PCTs in assessing the impact of PbR.  However, the issue of where responsibility 
should rest for different elements of monitoring and analysis, is a matter of debate.  Some functions 
may be best undertaken at the level of the StHA, centrally at the Department of Health, or by other 
bodies such as the Audit Commission, Monitor or Dr Foster. 
 
PCTs will of course be most aware of the local context in which services are provided and will be best 
placed to identify and investigate apparent anomalies and unwanted behaviours.  As well as detailed 
local information they would also benefit in some circumstances from having access to the broader 
picture in which to place the local situation – eg they may wish to know what is happening to activity in 
orthopaedics across the whole StHA area or even nationally to determine whether local trends are a 
cause for concern.  PCTs could also utilise benchmarking data across a wide range of areas (eg  
admissions from A&E) either by provider or by PCT.  This suggests there is a role for the StHAs or for 
national bodies to make such comparative data available in a format that would be useful for local and 
national monitoring purposes.  The latter is important as the Department of Health will be interested in 
the system-wide effects of PbR, not just local issues.  So for example, data on the changes in the 
proportion of HRGs coded as with and without complications (which may indicate up-coding 
behaviour) would be better understood by PCTs and StHAs if they were presented with the national 
picture across all providers rather than just examining their own local providers. 
 
The StHAs are probably best placed to organise collection of data where routine information is not 
available and where an issue becomes important locally. For example, they might look at referral 
patterns and distance travelled by patients from all the PCTs in the StHA if access is likely to be 
reduced by re-organisation of acute services in their area. 
 
Whilst a variety of different arrangements for reporting and monitoring are possible, it is worth 
remembering that the re-organisation of the NHS under the “Shifting the Balance of Power” sought to 
clarify roles of different agencies.
28
  The NHS is meant to resemble a pyramid of layers of 
accountability and responsibility, differing in terms of the degree of "localness" – with the Department 
of Health at the top, StHAs in the middle, followed by PCTs and on the bottom the providers. Each 
agent is responsible for assuring the good performance of the agents in the layer below in the 
hierarchy and checking adherence to national policy goals.  Thus StHAs are meant to play a key role 
in creating a strategic framework for PCTs and NHS trusts, agreeing on performance thresholds, 
planning strategies by which they can be achieved and monitoring that they are actually achieved.  
PCTs are held to account through the StHAs.  This suggests that one of the StHA’s key tasks would 
be to ensure that the implementation of PbR is going forward as expected and that the power of the 
incentives created by the policy are not diluted by local arrangements that inhibit change 
inappropriately. 
 
The role of the PCTs is similar to that of the StHAs but with a different span of control.  PCTs are 
charged with ensuring that the local network of providers is meeting the PbR targets. By managing 
resources, commissioning services across providers and monitoring performance of the providers, 
PCTs will secure the provision of high quality care according to the needs of the (local) population. In 
order to achieve this goal PCTs will need to effectively develop capacity management and build 
strong local co-operative partnerships among providers.  They will need to monitor for the positive and 
negative impacts of PbR whilst ensuring that the local health economy is not destabilised to the 
detriment of patients.  However, as mentioned previously, this is a matter of balance because if PCTs 
act too conservatively and fail to challenge the status quo, there is little chance of them securing 
major change in the provision of secondary care, facilitated by PbR.  There has already been some 
                                                 
28
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debate about the failure of PCTs to “punch their weight” in this respect and their future role may 
change again with the development of practice based commissioning and the move to a mixed 
economy in the provision of primary care.
29
  
 
In practice, the precise nature of the data collection, analysis and monitoring tasks best allocated to 
PCTs, StHAs, the Department of Health or other organisations is likely to depend not only on the 
definition of role boundaries, but also on the availability and quality of the capacity for data collection, 
processing and analysis.  Local organisations will have less capacity for detailed analytical work 
which may be better undertaken at the Department of Health.  The principles that can be used to 
guide decisions in this area include:  
 
 
 the need to ensure consistency in the definition and methods of data collection where national-
level data are required;  
 the imperative of collecting data only once and at the most appropriate and cost-effective level;  
 the importance of having a system for quality assuring data – which includes routine activity 
and cost data but also the vital issue of the quality of clinical coding underpinning PbR;  
 a system of incentives to encourage improvements in the quality of data collected and 
penalties for persistent errors; 
 a coherent strategy for monitoring the positive and negative impact of PbR which is 
underpinned by data and processes which all parties believe to be robust and reliable. 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The success of payment by results in delivering the policy aims outlined in section 2, will depend 
heavily on the ability of PCTs, StHAs, the Department of Health and other national agencies to 
effectively monitor and address the potential positive and negative impacts described in section 3.     
 
The key issues on which we have focused are those that economic theory suggests are the main 
priorities - because there is potential for prospective payment systems to create perverse incentives 
and encourage unwanted behaviours from providers.  Thus we would expect that monitoring efforts 
are directed accordingly.  In some cases this is relatively straightforward and the data will be available 
routinely, for example, recording activity trends over time and between providers in HRG groupings. 
Whilst in other cases, more detailed local knowledge and possibly special data collection exercises 
will be required, for example, investigating whether shifts in service provision cause access problems.   
Similarly, agencies at different levels will take on different responsibilities, as discussed in Section 7, 
and care will be needed to ensure an appropriate allocation of tasks, avoiding overlap and duplication 
of effort.  Investments will need to be made in creating robust quality assurance processes.  However, 
as we have described in Section 6, there are some design features of the PbR policy that will in 
principle help to offset some of the potentially negative impacts, making the achievement of the 
positive outcomes more likely. 
 
A major tension we have identified is the need for a balance to be struck between exploiting the high-
powered incentives of PbR to facilitate major service innovation and challenge historical patterns of 
delivery, with the need to avoid wholesale destabilisation of local health economies that would 
adversely affect patients.  PCTs may struggle to achieve this balance when faced with short-term 
delivery issues and this is probably a major task for the centre to tackle in conjunction with StHAs. 
                                                 
29
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